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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAE ADAMSON, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20010516-CA 
RANAE ADAMSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE (hereinafter "Respondent") submits the following as 
her brief in the above matter. 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order 
herein, which is the Order denying Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, pursuant to the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
1 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter before the trial court was a "Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce", 
and the matter being appealed before this Court is the "Order Denying the Petition to 
Modify." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal: For purposes of this appeal, is 
Appellant/Petitioner's case ripe for review by this Court? For purposes of this appeal, 
did the court abuse its discretion in finding that there was not a substantial and material 
change in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony? For purposes of this 
appeal, trial courts are in the best position to modify awards of alimony. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUES AND RULES 
The following statutes and cases are applicable to the disposition of this appeal: 
U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(7); Adelman v. Adelman. 815 P.2d 741, (UT App 1991); 
Johnson v.Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (UT App 1993); Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake City 
Commission. 624 P.2d 1138 (UT 1981); and Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103 
(UT App 1999). 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court has the "continuing jurisdiction" discretion to deny a modification 
in an alimony order, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) and (ii), if the 
court determines that the party petitioning the court has not reached his burden of 
demonstrating a substantial and material change in circumstances. 
The Appellate Court reviews these issues under the "Abuse of Discretion" 
standard. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent relies upon Petitioner's statement of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were husband and wife, but were divorced on February 
9, 1989, in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. See Exhibit "C." The court 
entered a permanent alimony obligation to Petitioner in the amount of $200.00 per month 
on behalf of the Respondent to become effective the date the decree was entered. Decree 
of Divorce at ^ f 11. The entire reference to alimony contained in the Findings of Fact 
read as follows: 
Both parties to this action are able-bodied and employable. However, Defendant 
[Respondent] is in need of support. It is reasonable, just, and proper that Plaintiff 
[Petitioner] be ordered to pay to the Defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars 
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($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, commencing with the month of February 
1989, and continuing until the death of the Plaintiff or Defendant, or until 
Defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until further 
order of this court. This award of alimony is subject to review by the court on 
July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. before the assigned judge. 
Findings of Fact at Tf 13. The alimony award did not change after the review date. 
The trial court that adjudicated the divorce action, also specifically addressed the 
Petitioner's retirement benefits. The court acknowledged that Petitioner would have 
benefits as a result of retirement and made an order in regard to the division of these 
benefits. The entire reference to retirement benefits contained in the Findings of Fact 
read as follows: 
[Petitioner] has acquired an interest in a retirement plan through his employment 
with the State of Utah, which should be divided equally between the parties 
according to the Woodward Formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
should issue from this Court. 
Findings of Fact at Tj 12. 
Petitioner brought his petition to modify because he was reaching retirement age 
and expressed that he wanted to retire. At the time of the trial, Petitioner had reached 
retirement age, however had made the choice to continue working. To date, Petitioner 
has not retired, he maintains his employment and has not experienced substantial and 
material changes in his work status. The trial court denied the Petition to Modify. 
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Despite being of retirement age and wishing to retire, the Petitioner had not retired 
because claims that he cannot afford to retire and continue to pay the small amount of 
alimony awarded to the Respondent. The trial court found: 
The Petitioner has not retired from employment, to date, despite his eligibility to 
do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will 
continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his 
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony obligation 
continues. This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his petition to 
modify the alimony obligation to terminate the obligation. 
Findings of Fact at f^ 12. 
The trial court appropriately found that the Petitioner's impending retirement was 
not a substantial material change in circumstances. The trial court repeatedly makes 
reference to the fact that Petitioner has chosen at the present time not to retire. The court 
further notes that: 
[T]he ruling that Judge Rigtrup made in the original divorce decree certainly 
contemplates retirement. If it didn't, [Respondent] would not have been awarded 
a percentage of [Petitioner's] retirement. At the same time, it awards alimony that 
goes past age 65. That's clear, too. So I would surmise that Judge Rigtrup meant 
that the alimony payment should go on [sic] retirement. 
Record, at 53, lines 5-16. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner brought a Petition to Modify the parties' Decree of Divorce as to the 
issue of alimony. Petitioner based his petition upon the expectation that he was 
considering retirement, and this future event constituted a material and substantial change 
in circumstance. Petitioner further claimed, that he would not be able to afford to retire 
and pay alimony to the Respondent. Therefore, Petitioner requested that the Court 
modify the parties' Decree of Divorce and terminate Respondent's permanent alimony 
award. The trial court denied the Petitioner's Petition to Modify. 
The trial court determined that the underlying basis for Petitioner's Petition to 
Modify did not rise to the standard of demonstrating that a material and substantial 
change in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, which 
may warrant a modification of the alimony. Petitioner had not retired at the time that he 
filed the petition and he asked the Court to consider the possibility of future events 
occurring, when ruling on this matter. Future events being Petitioner's impending 
retirement, that Respondent will apply for and receive social security benefits. Petitioner 
maintained that these would be material and substantial changes in circumstances not 
contemplated by the original court in issuing the Decree of Divorce. 
6 
The future retirement and social security benefits of the parties should be 
considered issues that are not ripe before the Court and therefore Petitioner's Petition to 
Modify was appropriately denied. The Utah Supreme Court notes that when parties find 
themselves in a position that may sometime in the future happen, this question is not ripe 
before the court for adjudication. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 
P.2d 1138 (UT 1981). 
The Court could not consider Petitioner's Petition to Modify in that his 
circumstances had no substantially and material changed since the Decree was entered. 
The Petitioner having not yet retired, makes it inappropriate for the Court to consider this 
as a material change since it had not yet happened. The Court appropriately did not make 
rulings or issue orders upon the parties' based upon the hope that these circumstances 
may occur. 
The Court determined that Petitioner had not met his burden demonstrating the 
material and substantial change in circumstances. It determined that the court having 
issued the original Decree of Divorce took into consideration the future of the parties' 
financial circumstances when it issued the permanent alimony award. 
The Court further noted, that it believed that the original trial court took into 
consideration the Petitioner's retirement in issuing the alimony award to Respondent. 
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The original trial court specifically addressed Petitioner's future retirement and 
Respondent's ongoing financial hardships when it issued the alimony. 
Finally, when the Court made a note of the parties' financial situations, it used 
approximations to measure the monetary value of parties' fiiture financial circumstances. 
The Appellate Court has noted that it is the trial court that should consider current 
evidence of the parties' financial situations, in that their circumstances may have changed 
during the appeal. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (UT App 1999). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY BECAUSE 
PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE AN ISSUE RIPE BEFORE THE 
COURT AND FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE TIME OF THE PARTIES' 
DIVORCE. 
Petitioner was almost 66 years old when his petition to modify came before the 
trial court. The parties were divorced on the 20 th day of March, 1989. The divorce 
decree provided two important applicable provisions: Petitioner was ordered to divide 
and share the equity in his retirement equally with the Respondent; and Petitioner was 
further ordered to pay Respondent alimony in the amount of $200.00 per month to 
continue until Respondent remarries, cohabits or either party dies. Petitioner brings his 
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petition to modify based upon the possibility that he may retire soon, and it would be a 
financial burden for him to continue to pay alimony. 
The trial court properly found that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that a 
substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred since the parties' decree 
of divorce. The issue of Petitioner's pending retirement goes to the heart of his case, 
however this argument is fundamentally flawed. The retirement which Petitioner is 
asking to be considered the substantial change necessary to modify the divorce decree, in 
fact has not occurred. Because the Petitioner's central issue to his case, has not 
transpired, this case is not ripe for ruling before the court. 
It is well settled law in Utah that the Court can not render decisions that are not 
ripe for adjudication. The Utah Court of Appeals affirms this position in Adelman v. 
Adelman, 815 P.2d 741 (UT App 1991). The Adelman case was brought before the 
court on appeal from an order to show cause clarifying in part, enforcing in part, and 
modifying in part from a divorce decree of the parties. Mr. Adelman claimed that the 
trial court erred in awarding Ms. Adelman survivorship benefits in the modification. The 
parties both agreed that Ms. Adelman had in fact remarried before the age of fifty-five 
which would render her ineligible for the survivor benefits. However, Ms. Adelman 
further contended that her survivorship benefits could be reinstated if her current 
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marriage ended in divorce, annulment, or widowhood. The Appellate Court determined 
that the issue was inappropriate for review since the issue was not ripe. "Ripeness occurs 
when "a conflict over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an actual 
or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between parties thereto." Aclelman v. 
Addrnan, 815P.2d741; Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 
(UT 1981) (Emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, Petitioner, Mr. Adamson, is asking the court to rule on an 
event in the future that has not transpired. Mr. Adamson has not retired, and is asking 
the Court to terminate the alimony award based upon the possibility of this event 
occurring. Petitioner asks the court to speculate that when or if this event happens, it 
should be considered a substantial change in circumstances in order to modify the 
parties' decree of divorce. It is undisputed that Petitioner/Appellant has not retired. The 
Petitioner is therefore asking the Court to rule on an issue that is not ripe before the 
Court. Despite the fact that Petitioner claims that he wants to retire, there is no actual 
issue before the Court, only the hypothetical situation that he will retire. Petitioner 
further encumbers the court with additional complexities that said retirement would 
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cause Petitioner a financial hardship if he was to continue paying Respondent alimony. 
The trial court found: 
The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his eligibility 
to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will 
continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his 
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony obligation 
continues. This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his petition to 
modify the alimony obligation to termination that obligation. 
Findings of Fact at |^ 16. (Emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court states that "[w]here there exists no more than a 
difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of [an insurance provision] 
to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the 
question is unripe for adjudication." Boyle et. al. V. National Fire Insurance Company, 
866 P.2d 595 at 597 (UT App 1993); Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake County Commission, 
624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (UT 1981). In the case at hand, Petitioner is asking the court to 
rule on a hypothetical question. The court acknowledges that if the parties were to 
change their positions, (i.e. Petitioner retire & Respondent waive alimony) it would be of 
benefit to both parties. However, since the question before the court has not yet 
happened, the court cannot force the parties to act in a reasonable manner. MThe 
Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to induce the 
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Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement benefits, which are greater than 
the alimony, is not reasonable in the premises. However, the court cannot require the 
parties to behave reasonably in settlement discussions." (Findings of Fact at % 20). It is 
clear from this finding that the court felt that its hands were tied, since the Petitioner had 
not actually retired. "If any action is ripe for adjudication, it is within the court's 
discretion to either grant or deny a party's request for declaratory relief. If on the other 
hand, an action is not ripe for adjudication, it is not within the trial court's discretion to 
grant declaratory relief, but instead the trial court must dismiss the action as a matter of 
law." Boyle, et. al. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company. 866 P.2d 595 at 598 (UT 
App 1993). The Utah Supreme Court notes that it was improper for a trial court to 
address certain issues, because the case itself was not "ripe" before the court. "The 
proper course would have been to dismiss for lack of ripeness. We may, however, 
'affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the court, even if it is 
one not relied on below.'" Salt Lake County v. Bangerter. 928 P.2d 384 (UT 1996). 
Based upon the mere possibility that Petitioner will at some point in the near 
future retire from his employment and begin to collect retirement benefits is not an 
adequate basis for his request to modify the divorce decree. The case at hand is not ripe 
for adjudication and the Court correctly dismissed Petitioner's Petition to Modify. 
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POINT 2 IF PETITIONER RETIRED, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER'S 
PETITION TO MODIFY THE ALIMONY AWARD ON THE BASIS 
THAT IT FOUND THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The facts of this case support the argument that the trial court that issued the 
original alimony award contemplated the totality of the parties' circumstances both at the 
time of the trial and on a long term basis. This is evidenced in several points of fact set 
forth in the record. The trial court specifically makes an alimony award that has no 
termination date, until certain events occur, (i.e. remarriage, cohabitation, or death of one 
of the parties, whichever occurs first). The Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent 
$200.00 per month in alimony. Then the Court also addresses the fact that the Petitioner 
will have retirement to which Respondent is entitled and awarded one-half. In the 
Finding of Facts f^ 15, the Court orders Respondent to pay child support in the amount of 
$75.00 per month. The Court clearly recognized that Respondent would have a difficult 
time in paying her support obligation in that it stated "[i]n any month when the 
[respondent] fails to make an actual monetary payment to [petitioner] for child support, 
the child support shall be deducted from [respondent's] lien upon the marital residence of 
the parties." The court recognized that Respondent had an ongoing and permanent 
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financial need and offset her obligations in her equity, rather than in her alimony income. 
It seems clear that the court took many things into consideration when computing 
alimony in this original decree including the ongoing permanent need that Respondent 
would have for this income. The court in the Petitioner's Petition to Modify specifically 
finds that: 'The [trial] court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the 
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's death or 
Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this the court concludes that 
the trial court originally did not intend alimony ever to terminate." Findings of Facts at ^ 
23. 
The trial court has the discretion and continuing jurisdiction to make 
modifications as to divorce decrees pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3). "However, where a 
future change in circumstances is contemplated by the trial court in the divorce decree, 
the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute a material change in 
circumstances sufficient to modify the award." Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (UT 
App 1993). "A change in circumstances reasonably contemplated at the time of divorce 
is not legally cognizable as a substantial change in circumstances in modification 
proceedings." Dana v. Dana. 789 P.2d 726, 729 (UT App 1990). The Court reasoned in 
the Johnson case that "[s]ince the trial court in the instant case divided the pension plan 
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between the parties, it was cognizant of Mrs. Johnson's ability to receive additional 
income in the future that would alter her financial condition and needs." Johnson v. 
Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (UT App 1993). 
Petitioner relies on the Bollinger v. Bollinger, 997 P.2d 903, (UT App 2000) case 
to support their argument. The Bollinger case, however, provides an additional fact 
situation that the case at hand does not possess. In Bollinger, the husband who was 
ordered to pay alimony, petitioned the court to modify the decree, based in part upon his 
"unexpected early retirement" Id. at 3. The early retirement coupled with Petitioner's 
receipt of social security was the basis for the Petition to Modify. In the instant case, the 
retirement of Petitioner is foreseeable, and not unexpected. The trial court specifically 
addresses the fact that there are retirement benefits that would be derived from 
Petitioner's retirement. Most people become eligible for retirement benefits at the age of 
sixty-five (65) and Petitioner is no different. He is currently 66 years old and eligible to 
reap the benefits of retirement. However, by his own choice, Petitioner has failed to 
retire and maintains his employment. 
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first 
show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of 
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Id. at 11. The responsibility is 
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therefore placed upon Petitioner to establish that there indeed has been a material change 
that has happened, not contemplated in the original divorce. Petitioner has failed to meet 
his burden in demonstrating such a change, therefore the court appropriately denied the 
petition to modify. The retirement which he claims as the basis for the Petition to 
Modify has not occurred. The present findings of fact for the Petition to Modify 
specifically address a reasonable belief that the original trial court took into consideration 
the Petitioner's retirement when determining the alimony award. 
POINT 3: IF A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE FOUND, THE ALIMONY AWARD 
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR MORE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS 
TO THE PARTIES' FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Petitioner contends that upon a finding that there have been a substantial and 
material change in circumstances, that there is no need for the matter to be remanded to 
the trial court for recalculate alimony. Petitioner maintains that there is a sufficient basis 
to terminate the alimony award. The Court in Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 
(UT App 1999) supports this premise: 
"[T]he power to terminate [alimony] should be exercised with caution and only 
after full consideration of the circumstances of the parties. . . .?f 24 Am. Jur. 2d 
Divorce and Separation § 813 (1998) (emphasis added). We note, for the trial 
court's guidance on remand, that for the trial court to terminate [an] alimony 
award, there must be an articulated basis for doing so, i.e., the court must be 
persuaded that [the recipient spouse] will be able to support [him- or] herself at a 
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standard of living to which [he or] she was accustomed during the parties' 
marriage, or that [the payor spouse] is no longer able to pay. 
(Williamson at 12). 
The Williamson Court goes on to note that the trial court should take into consideration 
the payor's loss of income, but that fact alone should not be enough to rationalize a 
complete termination of alimony. The termination of an alimony award should be done 
with caution. In Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (UT App 1990) the trial court 
terminated an alimony award to the wife upon her reaching the age of sixty-two. The 
Appellate court disagreed and found the following: 
In the present case, appellant is a woman in her late fifties, who, while in 
reasonably good health, has never been substantially employed and has not 
developed any employable skills. It is similarly unrealistic to assume that she will 
ever be able to provide for herself at any reasonable level. Therefore, the trial 
court abused its discretion in terminating her alimony award at age sixty-two. 
(Munns at 122). 
In the case before the Court, Respondent, Ms. Adamson, is in her sixties, has limited job 
skills and has been determined to be disabled. The court in Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 
431, 438 (UT App 1999), states that "the trial court should consider current evidence of 
the parties' financial situations, as their 'circumstances . . . may have changed during this 
appeal.'" 
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As to the Petitioner and Respondent, it would be very difficult to accurately 
ascertain the financial situation of the parties. Petitioner has not yet retired, Respondent 
has not applied for her Social Security benefits, and the trial court itself notes in its 
Findings several times that it approximates the parties' future financial positions. The 
termination or alteration of an alimony award should be based upon facts not 
approximations. Therefore, this court should not terminate Respondent's alimony award 
and if it deems necessary, should leave this to the discretion of the trial court. 
POINT 4 APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO 
ABIDE BY THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 
The trial court ordered both parties to bear their own substantial attorney's fees, 
which neither party has appealed (Findings Tf 21). When presented with this same 
situation (with a similar denial of the termination of alimony) in Carter v. Carter, 584 
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), the court agreed with defendant / appellee's argument that she 
should be entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal. The court's justification was 
simply "that inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's 
judgment, and that [defendant] has been put to the necessity of defending this appeal, the 
plaintiff should have to bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees for her 
counsel." (Carter at 906). 
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Appellee Ranae Adamson is disabled, and appellant has refused to voluntarily pay 
any portion of her alimony, absent court enforcement, from the date of the original 
decree of divorce. Appellee is entitled to attorney's fees for having to defend this appeal 
when her only source of income is Social Security Disability and the alimony ordered to 
be paid by Appellant. Appellee requests that attorney fees and costs be awarded on 
appeal, and that the case be remanded for the purpose of determining and awarding her 
such attorneys fees as the trial court finds to be reasonable and properly incurred on this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's arguments for appeal are fundamentally flawed. The basis for 
Petitioner's petition to modify is primarily based upon the premise that he may retire at 
some time in the future. Since the central issue to Petitioner's appeal has not occurred, 
the matter is not ripe for appeal and therefore the Court should deny Petitioner's request 
for relief. 
Despite the fact that the issues are not ripe, the premise for Petitioner's substantial 
and material change in circumstances stems again from the retirement issue. Petitioner's 
retirement may only be considered substantial and material so long as it was not 
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contemplated in the original decree of divorce. The burden is upon Petitioner to 
demonstrate that he has satisfied both of these prongs, which he fails to do. 
Finally, if this court were to deem it appropriate to recalculate the alimony 
amount, that should be remanded to the trial court to make an accurate and current 
determination as to the alimony award based upon the parties' present situations. 
For the reasons stated in Respondent's arguments, this court should deny all 
aspects of Petitioner's appeal and award Respondent costs and attorney's fees in 
defending this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / clay of YJL(JA3LJ 2002. 
NATHAN D. RACE 
STACEY G. SCHMIDT 
Attorneys for Appellee/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I delivered by hand, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing mail on / day of ^Ju^VU 2002 to: 
Mary C. Corporon 
Mary Cline 
Jarrod H. Jennings 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Exhibit "A" 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER DENYING PETITION TO 
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, 
-vs- Civil No. 874904654DA 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
Respondent. 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the court for trial on April 17, 
2001, Petitioner appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, Mary C. 
Corporon, Respondent appearing in person and by and through her counsel of record, 
Nathan Pace, the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and having 
received the exhibits of the parties, the court having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and for good 
cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following: 
rliEB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Cierk 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The parties to this action were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in 
the above-entitled case in 1989 
2. At the time of the divorce of the parties, they had been married for a 
period of time between 17 and 18 years 
3. At the time of the divorce, the parties were the parents of minor children, 
all of whom have now achieved their majority However, the Petitioner 
testified and the court finds that the Petitioner has an adult son residing 
with him, and that the Petitioner is supporting the youngest child of these 
two parties in serving a religious mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Petitioner was 
awarded custody of the parties' children, subject to Respondent's rights of 
visitation The Respondent was ordered to pay child support for the 
parties' children of $75 00 per month per child, and the court, within the 
—decree of divorce, specifically awarded Respondent an interest in the 
marital residence, but provided that her child support obligation would be 
set off against her home equity The court now finds that the trial court's 
prior determination to allow a set-off of child support against home equity 
constituted a finding by the court in the initial proceedings herein that the 
n 
Respondent could not be relied upon to pay support regularly to the 
parties' children 
4 Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Respondent was awarded alimony 
from the Petitioner in the sum of $200 00 per month The Petitioner failed 
to pay any of his alimony timely, and a judgment for alimony arrearages 
was previously entered against him in the above-entitled court, in the sum 
of $16,900 00 The Petitioner paid that to Respondent in a lump sum to 
satisfy this judgment early in the year 2000 Respondent has testified and 
the court finds that the Respondent has expended the entirety of the lump 
sum payment for these alimony arrearages in repaying a loan to her 
brother and, in paying her utilities and her usual and routine living 
expenses 
5. The Respondent did not pay any of her child support to the Petitioner, 
and eventually the entire amount of her child support was withheld from 
her equitable lien in the marital residence As a result thereof, the 
Respondent's equitable lien in the residence was extinguished, and 
Respondent has no remaining interest in the equity in the marital 
residence 
J 
6. The court finds that each party has been a "deadbeat," to some extent, 
the Petitioner for failure to pay alimony timely as previously ordered — the 
Respondent for failure to pay child support for the parties' minor children 
during their minority when they were in need of actual support. 
7. The court ordered the Petitioner to be taken into a holding cell to show 
him what the court can do with men who refuse to obey court orders. 
8. The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and 
will achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the 
date of trial herein. 
9. Based upon the court's observations of the Petitioner at trial, his 
demeanor and appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there 
is a cultural expectation in our society that persons can retire from full-
time employment at the age of 65, the court finds that it is reasonable, just 
and proper that the Petitioner retire at this time. 
10. The Respondent herein is 58 years of age. The Respondent is not 
currently employed and has not been employed at all since the entry of 
the decree of divorce herein. The Respondent testified and the court 
finds that the Respondent did not ever make any application for any 
employment since the entry of the decree of divorce, as previously 
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ordered by the court The Respondent has testified that she did not make 
application for employment because of her disability The court finds that 
she has not endeavored to improve her situation The court finds 
Respondent could have done so, if she had tried and if she had wanted 
to 
11. The Respondent receives Social Security Disability benefits in the sum of 
$530 00 per month The Respondent testified that she did not receive 
any other income from any other source, including food stamps or public 
assistance However, the Respondent does receive the benefit of public 
housing, and her rent for her apartment is approximately $87 00 per 
month after the subsidy, for an apartment usually renting for $500 00 per 
month 
12. The Respondent has reasonable and necessary living expenses, in 
addition to $87 00 per month for rent, of $150 00 per month for utilities, 
$250 00 per month for food and household supplies, and that she is 
entitled to incur reasonable expenses for such things as clothing or 
transportation The Respondent does not have a motor vehicle nor does 
she have a telephone She testified to the court from the witness stand 
that she is physically able to ride the city bus 
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13 The Respondent was married to the Pet.tl0ner for a period of time in 
excess of 10 years and the Petitioner has now ach!eved the age of 65 
Accordingly, the court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to obtain Social 
Security retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration, 
based upon the Petitioner's receiving Social Security retirement benefits 
However, the Respondent has failed to make application for these 
benefits The court finds that, were she to apply for Social Security 
retirement benefits those benefits would be received by her in the sum of 
approximately $500 00 to $700 00 per month 
14 The Respondent is entitled to rece.ve a portion of the Petitioner's 
retirement benefits, based upon her marriage to the Petitioner during a 
period of time when he was also employed by his current employer, the 
State of Utah The court finds that, therefore, the Respondent would be 
entitled to rece.ve approximately 25% of the actual ret.rement benefit 
awarded to the Petitioner, or approximately $6,500 00 per year or 
$541 66 per month, upon the Petitioner's retirement from full-time 
employment 
15 The court finds that, were the Petitioner to retire from his employment with 
the State of Utah and were Respondent to receive Social Security 
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retirement benefits and her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, the 
Respondent would be in a significantly better economic position than she 
is at the present time, receiving Social Security disability benefits and 
alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200 00 per month 
16 The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his 
eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation 
to pay alimony will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that 
he will be unable to meet his expenses on a reduced income from 
retirement, if the alimony obligation continues This was the Petitioner's 
stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the alimony obligation to 
terminate that obligation 
17 The Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah Division o* Child and 
Family Services as a social worker His gross annual income is 
approximately $40,000 00, or $3,333 33 per month From this is withheld 
federal and state taxes of approximately $848 00, and his net income is 
$2,485 33 per month 
18 In addition to the foregoing income from his employment, the Petitioner 
has requested and has begun to receive Social Security retirement 
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benefits by reason of his having achieved his 65th birthday and those 
benefits are paid to him in the sum of approximately $1,250 00 per month 
19 The Petitioner has reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses as 
follows 
Rent/Mortgage 
Property Taxes 
Insurance 
Maintenance 
Food/Supplies 
Utilities (water/gas/ 
electric/heat 
Telephone 
Laundry/Dry Clean 
Clothing 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Medical and Dental $ 
Medical Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Union Dues 
Entertainment 
Incidentals 
Auto expenses 
Installments 
Other expenses 
Other expenses 
Attorney's fees 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
400 00 to amortize the loan or $280 00 to pay 
interest only 
110 00 
45 00 
100 00 
460 00 
150 00 
55 00 
10 00 
50 00 
125 00 
30 00 
35 00 
14 00 
100 00 
100 00 
250 00 
$1 176 00 
$ 
$ 
$ 
200 00 (alimony) 
380 00 (missionary cost for son on mission) 
150 00 
TOTAL EXPENSES $3,940 00 
20 The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case in order to 
induce the Petitioner to retire so that she can receive his retirement 
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benefits which are greater than the alimony is not reasonable in the 
premises However the court cannot require the parties to behave 
reasonably in settlement discussions 
21 Each party to this action has incurred substantial attorney's fees, and 
each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court 
costs and attorney s fees incurred in this action 
22 Petitioner has requested that this court order that alimony terminate after 
the duration of the parties' marriage, given the adoption of new statutory 
law generally limiting the duration of alimony to the length of a marriage 
The court declined to grant this request 
23 The court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the 
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's 
death or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this, 
this court concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony 
ever to terminate 
BASED UPON the foregoing and for good cause appearing the court now makes 
and enters the following 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The court has jurisdiction oyer the subject matter to this action and over 
the parties to this action 
2. There has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances 
warranting a modification of alimony 
3. The Petitioner does not come to this court with clean hands, and is 
therefore not entitled to the relief which he is seeking 
4. The court should not modify the duration of the alimony, to terminate after 
the duration of the parties' marriage 
ORDER 
BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and for good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
The Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is hereby dismissed, 
each party ta-pay and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
this action 
10 
DATED THIS *& day of l/U± 
*f 2001 
BY THE COURT 
STEPHEN L HENFHQQ *
 %N 
District Court JudgeV^A.^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed to 
NATHAN PACE 
Attorney for Respondent 
136 South Main, #404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this / day of ,2001 
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Exhibit "B" 
MARY C. CORPORON #7 34 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- Civil No. D87-4654 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February, 
1989, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; the 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C. 
Corporon, and the defendant appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and more than 90 days having 
elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, the 
Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are now, and were for a period 
By. 
niEBBlSTWCTCSBRT 
ThKd Judicial District 
MAR 2 0 1989 
S * u LAKcCUUNTY 
Deputy Glmck 
of three months or more immediately prior to the filing of th< 
Complaint in this action, residents of Salt Lake County, State ol 
Utah. 
2. The parties to this action are husband and wife, havinc 
been married on April 17, 1970. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties, making continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. There have been two children born as issue of this 
marriage, namely: Shandrae, age 15, and Tracy, age 8. Plaintiff 
is a fit and proper person to be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of said minor children, subject to 
defendant's rights of visitation. 
5. Defendant should be awarded visitation weekly with the 
minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged 
directly between the defendant and the parties' children. The 
Court recommends that this visitation occur either on a Saturday 
or on a Sunday. In addition, defendant should have visitation 
with the minor children on alternate state and federal holidays, 
on her birthday, and on the children's birthday, as she may 
arrange between herself and the children. Further, defendant 
should have reasonable and liberal telephone access with the 
minor children. The defendant's visitation with the children 
should be unsupervised; however, in the event that the defendant 
should be intoxicated at the commencement of the visitation or 
become so during the course of the visitation, then the children 
need not remain for the balance of the visitation. 
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children 
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of the parties, as it is available to him through his employment. 
7. It is reasonable., just and proper that the entire 
family, including plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor 
children, be ordered, to submit to counseling with a qualified 
family therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health, 
the Utah State Department of Social Services, or another 
qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the 
conflict between the defendant and the minor children of the 
parties. 
8. The parties have acquired an interest in a pickup truck 
and a Ford automobile, which the Court finds to be of relatively 
equal value, with no indebtedness owing on either. Plaintiff 
should be awarded the truck, free and clear of any interest of 
the defendant and the Ford Granada should be awarded to the 
defendant free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
9. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
incurred various debts and obligations. Plaintiff should be 
ordered to pay and assume all debts and obligations incurred by 
the parties until the date of the divorce herein, including, 
specifically, any debt incurred by defendant for her living 
accommodations. 
10. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and 
belongings, and household furnishings, fixtures and appliances. 
Defendant should be awarded the grandfather clock, one set of 
bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of the 
tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual table 
and chairs as her sole and separate property, free and clear of 
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any interest of the plaintiff. Other than as set forth herein, 
the parties' previous division of their items of personalty and 
furniture, fixtures and appliances should be confirmed each and 
each party should be awarded those items currently in his or her 
possession. 
11. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain real property located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, commonly known as 4195 South 1865 
East. Plaintiff should be awarded the permanent use and 
possession of said real property, and all right, title and 
interest therein, including the right to any reserve account, 
free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject to the 
first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon, which 
plaintiff should be ordered to pay and assume and hold defendant 
harmless thereon, and defendant should be ordered to execute a 
Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may have in said 
real property to the plaintixfW Defendant should be awarded an 
equitable lien on said real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00), representing her one-half share of the 
equity in the real property, said lien to be non-interest-bearing 
and to become payable to defendant on the first to occur of the 
following events: 
a. plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home 
with a woman other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest child of the parties attaining the age 
of 18 years or graduating from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
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d. the sale of the real property at plaintiffs 
election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as 
his primary place of residence. 
12. Plaintiff has acquired an interest in a retirement plan 
through his employment with the State of Utah, which should be 
divided equally between the parties, according to the Woodward 
formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should issue 
from this Court. 
13- Both parties to this action are able-bodied and 
employable. However, defendant is in need of support. It is 
reasonable, just and proper that plaintiff be ordered to pay to 
defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as 
and for alimony, commencing with the month of February 1989, and 
continuing until the death of the plaintiff or defendant, or 
until defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first 
occurs, or until further order of this Court. This award of 
alimony is subject to review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 
8:30 a.m., before the assigned judge. 
14. Defendant should be ordered to pursue all employment 
opportunities and all job training opportunities available to 
her, including, but not limited to, making application for 
assistance with the following: the Phoenix Institute, Job 
Service, Utah State Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, the 
Utah State Department of Social Services and colleges and 
universities in the Salt Lake area for a PELL grant. Further, 
defendant should be ordered to make a reasonable and concerted 
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through 
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of 
three applications for employment per week with prospective 
employers. Defendant should be ordered to report her job search 
efforts to this Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989. 
15. It is reasonable, just and proper that the Court impute 
a minimum wage income earning capability to the defendant in 
assessing the defendant's obligation for child support. The 
Court does so, and imputes to defendant the ability to earn 
income in the gross sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per 
month. Further, the Court finds that the plaintiff's gross 
monthly income is in the sum of Two Thousand One Hundred Ten 
Dollars ($2,110.00) per month. Based upon these income figures, 
the Court calculates defendant's child support obligation to be 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing 
with the month of February 19 89 and continuing until such time as 
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from 
high school in the normal course of their high school educations, 
whichever event occurs later. In any month when the defendant 
fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child 
support, the child support shall be deducted from defendant's 
lien upon the marital residence of the parties. 
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears 
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
16. It is reasonable, just and proper that each party pay 
and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees. 
17. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
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necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this 
action and over the subject matter of this action. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between the parties, the same to become final and effective 
immediately upon being signed by the Judge and entered by the 
Clerk in the register of actions. 
3. The Decree of Divorce granted to plaintiff should be in 
conformance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED THIS %6 ~~day of r W : t / , 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
i f 7 t j 7 
KENNETH RIGTRUP U 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to be served upon defendant by placing a true and correct 
copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
JEFFREY C. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
22 5 South 200 East 
Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the day of February, 1989. 
.  )VLl'JtLs i\ . fur cm i i-^ 
Secretary 
Exhibit "C" 
A^JRv C. CORPORON #7 34 
attorney for Plaintiff 
ZORPORON Sc WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D87-4654 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February, 
1989, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; the 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C. 
Corporon, and the defendant appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and more than 9 0 days having 
elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the 
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
RLEDDfSTRfCTCWWT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 0 1989 
/ S A - U L A K E COUNTY 
I'UCLPMCfj 
U«pofy Cterk 
RAE ADAMSON, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
RANAE ADAMSON, 
Defendant• 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions• 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties, Shandrae and 
Tracy. 
3. Defendant is hereby awarded visitation weekly with the 
minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged 
directly between the defendant and the parties' children, taking 
into consideration the Court's recommendation that this 
visitation occur either on a Saturday or on a Sunday. In 
addition, defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children 
on alternate state and federal holidays, on her birthday, and on 
the children's birthday, as she may arrange between herself and 
the children. Further, defendant is awarded reasonable and 
liberal telephone aiccess with the minor children. The 
defendant's visitation with the children shall be unsupervised; 
however, in the event that the defendant should be intoxicated at 
the commencement of the visitation or become so during the course 
of the visitation, the children shall not be required to visit 
with the defendant on that occasion. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and accident 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the 
parties, as it is available to him through his employment. 
5. Plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor children, 
are hereby ordered to submit to counseling with a qualified 
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amily therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health, 
he Utah State Department of Social Services, or another 
[ualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the 
onflict between the defendant and the minor children of the 
>arties. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the truck, free and clear of 
Lny interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the 
'ord Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff, 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all debts and 
ibligations incurred by the parties until the date of the divorce 
Lerein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant 
or her living accommodations. 
8. The parties' previous division of their items of 
>ersonal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, and household 
"urnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each 
md each party is awarded those items currently in his or her own 
>ossession, with the exception of the following items, which are 
lereby awarded to the defendant: the grandfather clock, one set 
>f bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of 
:he tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual 
:able and chairs. 
9. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent use and 
possession of the real property of the parties located at 4195 
^uth 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right, 
.tie and interest therein, including the right to any reserve 
count, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject 
) the first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon, 
hich plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold 
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defendant harmless thereon. Defendant is hereby ordered to 
execute a Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may 
have in said real property to the plaintiff./ Further, defendant 
is hereby awarded a non-interest bearing equitable lien on said 
real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), 
representing her one-half share of the equity in the real 
property, payable upon the first to occur of the following 
events: 
a. plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home 
with woman other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest child of the parties attaining the age 
of 18 years or graduating from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
d. the sale of the real property at plaintiff's 
election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as 
his primary place of residence. 
10. Plaintiff's retirement plan through his employment with 
the State of Utah, is ordered to be divided between the parties, 
according to the Woodward formula, and a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order shall issue from this Court. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant the sum 
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, 
commencing with the month of February 19 89, and continuing until 
the death of the plaintiff or defendant, until defendant's 
remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until 
further order of this Court. This award of alimony is subject to 
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review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the 
assigned judge. 
12. Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment 
opportunities and all job training opportunities available to her 
as set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court. 
Further, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted 
sffort to obtain employment, including making contacts through 
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of 
three applications for employment per week with prospective 
employers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this 
Zourt at the hearing on July 7, 1989. 
13- Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing 
tfith the month of February 19 89 and continuing until such time as 
Lhe minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from 
ligh school in the normal course of their high school educations, 
whichever event occurs later. In any month when the defendant 
fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child 
support, said child support shall be deducted from defendant's 
lien on the marital residence of the parties. 
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears 
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
14. Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own 
court costs and attorney's fees. 
15. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
5 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
DATED THIS ?^ 0'~"day Of Jt\aA6^ , 13 39. 
BY THE COURT 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
D i s t r i c t Cour t J u d g e 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
orporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
caused the foregoing proposed Decree of Divorce to be served 
ipon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in 
m envelope addressed to: 
JEFFREY C. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
225 South 200 East 
Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ind depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dn the Ay- day of February, 1989. 
Secretary cy 
